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 ABSTRACT  
 
This paper evaluates the role of Korean government in the venture capital industry, in particular in 
the stages of fund-raising and venture investment. Utilizing data from Korean Venture Capital 
Association (KVCA), the analysis is conducted for the venture boom and post-boom periods 
separately. Empirical results show that the government played a significant role in the fund-raising 
stage in both venture boom and post-boom periods. When it comes to the investment stage, however, 
the empirical results indicate that the government did not accomplish expected roles. In particular, the 
government failed to induce investments in the outside funds of which the government had a larger 
stake toward early-staged firms and guide common stock investments during the venture boom 
period. The empirical outcomes also show that the government has not properly increased venture 
investments on high-tech industries during the post-boom period. This paper argues tentative reasons 
why the policy failures were observed in relation to the policy implications and provide several 
pieces of supporting evidence.  
 
 
 
 
본 논문은 1990년대 후반 이후 벤처캐피
털 산업, 특히 자금조달과 벤처투자단계에
서의 한국 정부의 역할을 평가한다. 실증분
석은 한국벤처캐피털협회에서 입수한 미시
자료를 활용하여 벤처붐 시기와 그 이후의
시기를 구분하여 이루어졌다. 실증분석 결
과, 한국 정부는 벤처캐피털의 자금조달과
관련하여 벤처붐 시기와 그 이후 모두에서
유의미한 역할을 수행하였던 것으로 나타
났다. 이와 달리 투자단계에서 요구되는 정
부 의 역할은 제대로 수행하지 못했던 것으
 
로 나타났다. 특히, 분석 결과는 벤처붐 시
기에 한국 정부가 자신이 참여한 투자조합
의 벤처투자를 초기기업에 대한 투자, 보통
주 투자로 유도하는 데 실패하였음을 보여
준다. 벤처붐 이후에는 고기술산업군에 대
한 투자 유도에 실패하였던 것으로 나타났
다. 본 논문은 이와 같은 정책실패가 발생
한 이유에 대해 가설을 제시하고 그 가설
을 뒷받침하는 몇 가지 실증적인 근거를 
제공한다.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Korea’s venture capital industry experienced a boom during the years of 
1998-2000 and shrank rapidly thereafter with the abrupt ending of the boom. After 
the bubble burst, the industry has been in a steady recovery since 2003. The Korean 
government has made considerable efforts to develop venture capital industry as a 
critical route of innovative financing since the mid 1990s. The government has 
played an important role in the fund-raising process by directly making significant 
capital commitments. It also helped the exit process of venture capital investments 
by establishing KOSDAQ stock market in 1996, which provided venture- 
capital-backed companies with a window of IPO.1 Compared with the U.S. that is a 
predominant country in venture capital investments, the venture capital industry in 
Korea is situated at an early stage and needs significant development and 
improvement. For instance, the venture capital investments in the U.S. amount to 
$25.5 billion in 2006, which accounts for 0.19 % of the U.S. GDP. In contrast, the 
amount of venture capital investment in Korea is just $0.75 billion in 2006, 
representing 0.095% of the GDP. The venture capital industry in Korea, vis-à-vis the 
U.S., also poses structural weak points. For example, the government remains as the 
largest investor of outside funds.2 The stipulated life spans of outside funds are 
mostly five years.3 As for an exit, M&A takes up less than five percent of total 
venture capital investment recovery, unlike the U.S. where M&A is a dominant exit 
window. The organizational structure of venture capital firms has been a 
corporation; establishing a venture capital firm in the form of limited liability 
company (LLC) was not approved until 2005. These defects work as structural 
constraints on the development of the venture capital industry in Korea. 
Among the above mentioned shortcomings of the venture capital industry, this 
study pays attention to the fact that the Korean government is the most influential 
playmaker, and analyzes the role that the government has played since the late 1990s 
in the stages of fund-raising and venture investment. Many papers in the past 
investigated venture capital industry in various aspects.4 Among those, Lee (2003) 
                                            
1 Rin et al. (2000) found that the opening of stock markets targeted at entrepreneurial companies positively 
affects the shares of early stage and high-tech venture capital investments.  
2 In Korea, a venture capital firm operates two different sources of funds. One is outside fund which is 
organized by external investors’ capital commitments and the other is inside fund which is internally 
raised. I will explain the fund-raising and organizational structures of the venture capital industry in Korea 
more in detail in the next section. 
3 When organizing an outside fund, a venture capitalist stipulates an expiration date of the fund.  
4 For a comprehensive overview of previous literature on the venture capital industry, see Gompers and 
Lerner (2001); for an overview of previous literature on the role of contracting, screening, and monitoring 
in mitigating principal-agent conflicts, see Kaplan and Stromberg (2001); for the relationship between 
incentive contracts and market structure in an adverse selection setting or in a moral hazard setting, see 
Inderst (2001), and Inderst and Muller (2002); for the syndication and staged investment, see Admati and 
Pfleiderer (1994), Bergemann and Hege (1998), and Brander et al. (2002); for the structure and governance 
of venture capital organization and their performance, see Gompers and Lerner (1998b) and Sahlman 
(1990); and for the influence of a robust initial offering market on venture investment behaviors, see Black 
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and Rin et al. (2000) are closely related to this paper in that they deal with the role of 
government or public policy in the development of active venture capital markets. 
No previous research, however, has attempted to empirically evaluate the role that 
the government has actively taken in the stages of fund-raising and venture 
investment, which gives the uniqueness to this paper. For an analysis, data from 
Korean Venture Capital Association (KVCA) on fund-raising and venture 
investment were used. The evaluation on the role of the government is then 
conducted for the venture boom and post-boom periods separately, taking into 
account possible structural changes between these periods. More specifically, in 
order to evaluate the government’s role in raising venture capital, this paper 
measures the size of the government capital commitments and uncovers how 
effectively the public capital commitments have attracted private capital in the 
venture boom and post-boom periods. Looking into the government’s role in the 
investment stage, the following four criteria were chosen: (1) the average age of 
invested firms; (2) the ratio of venture investments in high-tech industries; (3) the 
ratio of investments in high- and medium-tech industries; and, (4) the ratio of 
common stock investments. The role of the government was evaluated by focusing 
on the changes of four variables as the share of government capital commitments in 
outside funds increases. 
The empirical analyses show that the government played a significant role at the 
fund-raising stage in both venture boom and post-boom periods. The government 
has provided a considerable amount of capital to venture capital firms for their 
venture investments. This direct role of the government in the fund-raising stage 
seems to have been reinforced after the boom burst. It is also found that the 
government has played an effective role in attracting the private investors’ capital in 
the post-boom period.  
When it comes to the investment stage, the empirical results do not convey a clear 
answer to the question of whether the government accomplished expected roles 
during the venture boom and the post-boom periods. Regarding the age of invested 
firms and the common stock investment, the empirical outcomes show that the 
government failed to induce investments in the outside funds of which the 
government had a larger stake toward early-staged firms and guide common stock 
investments during the venture boom period. This type of apparent policy failure, 
however, disappeared after the boom and policy improvement seems to have been 
made on the two criteria. Regarding the investments in the high-tech industries, the 
story is completely opposite. A related empirical analysis tells us that the 
government has not properly increased venture investments on high-tech industries 
during the post-boom period, not the venture boom period. This paper argues 
                                                                                                               
and Gilson (1998) and Jeng and Wells (2000). Kortum and Lerner (2000) evaluated the role of venture 
capital in an economy’s overall process of innovation and Hellmann and Puri (2000) analyzed 
interrelations between investor types (venture capital vs. other financing) and product market strategies 
and outcomes of start-ups. Gompers and Lerner (2004) collected their papers examining U.S. venture 
capital industry in the fund-raising, investing, and exiting stages. Finally, Lee et al. (2003) investigated the 
difference in investment behavior according to the sources of funds (inside funds vs. outside funds) in 
Korean venture capital industry.  
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tentative reasons why the policy failures were observed in relation to the policy 
implications and provide several pieces of supporting evidence. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the 
current status of the venture capital industry in Korea and its characteristics. Section 
3 provides data description. Section 4 evaluates the role of the Korean government in 
the fund-raising process by measuring the size of the government capital 
commitments and estimating the responsiveness of private sector to the government 
capital commitments in outside funds. Section 5 examines the role of the government 
in the investment stage. Analyses will be conducted focusing on the effects of the 
government participation on the investment behaviors of outside funds. To explain 
observed changing patterns in the investment behaviors, I suggest a hypothesis and 
also provide several pieces of indirect evidence relating to that. Finally, Section 6 
concludes the analysis by summarizing the results and suggesting a direction for 
future research.  
 
 
2. Venture Capital Industry in Korea 
 
 
This section, first, explains the organizational structure of venture capital firm in 
Korea. Then the current status of venture capital industry in Korea is described and 
its characteristics are explained. 
 
 
2.1 Venture Capital Firm as a Corporation 
 
Different from the U.S., the organizational form of venture capital firms in Korea 
is corporation. Shareholders of venture capital firms pay capital and employ 
managers and venture capitalists who will invest the paid-in capital. Besides the 
paid-in capital, the venture capital firms also raise outside funds. Therefore, the 
venture capitalists in Korea have two different sources of capital pools to invest. One 
is own fund or inside fund composed of paid-in capital and debt, and the other is 
outside funds which are made by outside investors who are called limited partners.5 
As shown in Lee et al. (2003), this organizational structure of co-management of 
inside fund and outside funds within a single entity contains the potential 
opportunistic behaviors of venture capitalists. 
 
 
2.2 Current Status of Venture Capital Industry in Korea 
 
Venture boom and its ending In Korea, the venture capital industry experienced a 
venture boom during 1998-2000. During the boom, 98 new venture capital firms 
                                            
5 For clear contrast with ‘outside’ fund, I use a terminology of ‘inside’ fund instead of ‘own’ fund 
hereinafter. 
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were established and 281 outside funds were newly organized. 6  Three factors 
contributed to the boom: ① IT boom started in 1997; ② the government’s policy 
effort to develop the venture capital industry; ③ the establishment of KOSDAQ 
market as a window of new companies’ IPOs. As the IT boom disappeared since 
2000, the venture boom also ended. Many small-sized venture capital firms closed 
their businesses and new investment shrank abruptly in 2001 and remained at a low 
level since then.  
Rapid growth of outside funds After the burst of boom, a main trend in the 
venture capital industry in Korea was the development of outside funds. The 
amount of outside funds per firm has increased almost four times in five years as 
shown in Table 1. Table 2 summarizes the changes in the proportion of inside and 
outside funds in the total venture capital raised. In 2000, the total size of inside funds 
amounted to $4.2 billion and accounted for almost 70 percent of the total venture 
capital raised. The size of outside funds was just $1.9 billion and represented only 31 
percent of the total venture capital. Since then, however, the size of inside funds has 
shrunk and the size of outside funds increased rapidly. In 2005, the total size of 
outside funds amounts to $4.6 billion and accounts for more than 70 percent of the 
total venture capital.     
 
<Table 1> Summary Statistics for Venture Capital Fund-raising 
(Unit: $ Million) 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
No. of venture capital firms 147 145 128 117 105 102 
Paid-in capital per firm 11.51 11.66 12.94 13.37 15.21 14.90 
Asset per firm 30.49 26.46 26.12 20.84 25.18 24.52 
Outside fund per firm 12.95 16.02 22.20 27.91 39.59 45.34 
Source: 2006 KVCA Yearbook. 
 
<Table 2> Trend of Venture Capital Fund-raising 
(Unit: $ Billion, %) 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Inside fund 4.18 (68.7) 
3.44 
(59.7) 
2.85 
(50.0) 
1.92 
(37.0) 
2.02 
(32.7) 
1.83 
(28.4) 
Outside fund 1.90 (31.3) 
2.32 
(40.3) 
2.85 
(50.0) 
3.27 
(63.0) 
4.16 
(67.3) 
4.62 
(71.6) 
Total 6.09 5.77 5.70 5.19 6.17 6.45 
Source: 2006 KVCA Yearbook. 
                                            
6 Before the venture boom, there were only 50 venture capital firms. Also, only 42 outside funds were 
organized during the period of 1989-1997. 
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<Table 3> Trend of Venture Capital Investment 
(Unit: $ Billion, %) 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Inside fund 1.48 (64.8) 
1.23 
(53.0) 
1.19 
(46.4) 
0.94 
(40.5) 
0.87 
(34.3) 
0.64 
(28.7) 
Outside fund 0.80 (35.2) 
1.09 
(47.0) 
1.38 
(53.6) 
1.38 
(59.5) 
1.67 
(65.7) 
1.60 
(71.3) 
Balance of 
total investment 
Total 2.28 2.32 2.57 2.32 2.54 2.24 
Inside fund 0.13 (25.4) 
0.11 
(21.0) 
0.08 
(13.8) 
0.12 
(16.2) 
Outside fund 
1.60 0.68 
0.39 
(74.6) 
0.42 
(79.0) 
0.50 
(86.2) 
0.63 
(83.8) 
New investment 
Total 1.60 0.68 0.52 0.53 0.58 0.75 
Source: 2006 KVCA Yearbook. 
 
This tendency of rapid development of outside funds in the fund-raising stage is 
also observed in the investment stage. Table 3 outlines the trend of venture capital 
investment since 2000. Whereas the amount of new investment from the inside funds 
rapidly decreased, new investment from the outside funds has steadily increased, 
thereby representing 83.8 percent of new investment made in 2005. Reflecting the 
trend in the new investment, the portion of balance of total investment accounted by 
the outside funds has also increased about two times in five years. 
 
 
2.3 Characteristics of Venture Capital Industry in Korea   
 
Significant role of government in the fund-raising Reflecting the fact that the 
venture capital industry in Korea is still at an early stage of development, the Korean 
government is taking on a significant role in the fund-raising of outside funds. Table 
4 summarizes the capital commitments to the outside funds by partner type during 
the period of 2001-2005. The government is the largest investor by providing on 
average 27.1 percent of committed capital to each outside fund and corporations and 
venture capital firms follow next. This structure of fund-raising contrasts with the 
U.S. In the U.S., the major investors in the venture capital market are private and 
public pension funds, financial/insurance companies, endowments and foundations, 
and they represent at least 80 percent of the venture capital raised. The U.S. 
government only supports the fund-raising of public venture capital firms which is 
called SBICs (Small Business Investment Companies). 
Short life span of outside funds Another characteristic of venture capital industry 
in Korea is that the life spans of outside funds are mainly five years. Table 5 shows a 
general outline of the life spans of outside funds organized during the period of 
1989-2007. 480 (76.3 percent) out of 630 funds stipulate a five-year life span and only 
102 funds have a life span equal to or more than seven years. This picture becomes 
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<Table 4> Capital Commitments to Outside Funds by Partner Type (2001-2005) 
(Unit: %) 
Government Corporation VC Firms Pension Funds 
Institutional 
Investors Individuals 
Foreign 
Investors 
27.1 19.0 16.0 15.1 13.6 5.6 3.6 
Source: 2006 KVCA Yearbook. 
 
<Table 5> Life Span of Outside Funds (1989-2007) 
Life Span 5 years 6 years 7 years 8 years or more Total 
1989-1999 70(57.4)a 20(16.4) 20(16.4) 12(9.8) 122(100) 
2000-2003 327(88.9) 13(3.5) 26(7.1) 2(0.5) 368(100) 
2004-2007 84(60.0) 14(10.0) 38(27.1) 4(2.9) 140(100) 
Total 481(76.3) 47(7.5) 84(13.3) 18(2.9) 630(100) 
Note: a. Numbers in parenthesis are the proportions of each group. 
 
clearer when focusing on the period of 2000-2003. Almost 90 percent of the funds 
organized during this period have a five-year life span. Even though this tendency 
has been alleviated since 2004, still 60 percent of the funds stipulate a five-year life 
span. A five-year life span is much shorter compared with the U.S. case in which the 
life spans of venture capital funds are mainly 10 years or more. 
Dominant proportion of IPO as a device of exit The venture capital industry in 
Korea also contrasts with that of the U.S. in respect to the exit device. Figure 1 
compares Korea with the U.S. by the exit type of venture investment. Whereas M&A 
is a dominant exit window in the U.S., it represents less than five percent of total 
exits in Korea, which reflects the Korea’s underdeveloped M&A market. IPOs 
through the KOSDAQ market consist of dominant portion in the total exits of 
venture investment.  
Increasing proportion of expansion-staged invested firms The above mentioned 
characteristics of the venture capital industry in Korea, i.e., short life spans of outside 
funds and venture investment exiting mainly through the IPO, have a strong 
implication regarding the ages of invested firms. In Korea, it is expected to generally 
take more than seven years for a newly established venture firm to offer its stock to 
the public.7 Therefore, for Korean venture capital firms that have to exit from the 
investment within three or four years and depend only on the IPO as an exit device, 
it is natural to concentrate their venture investment on expansion-staged companies 
that have lasted more than three years. During the venture boom of 1998-2000, this 
structural constraint on venture investment was not as serious since an interval taken 
for a new venture company to go public in those days was much shorter than now. 
                                            
7  For venture invested companies that succeeded in going public, the average interval from the 
establishment to the IPO was 7.2 years in 2004 and 7.6 years in 2005 (2006 KVCA Yearbook).  
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[Figure 1] IPO and M&A as a Device of Exit: Comparison of Korea vs. U.S. 
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Source: NVCA homepage (http://www.nvca.org). 
 
[Figure 2] New Investment by Invested Company Stage 
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Note: Startup/seed stage (less than 1 year); early stage (1 - 3 years); expansion 
stage (3 - 7 years); later stage (more than 7 years). 
Source: 2006 KVCA Yearbook. 
 
After 2000, the venture boom disappeared and the interval for an IPO has increased. 
The structural constraint of venture capital industry in Korea became apparent and 
the portion of venture investment toward expansion- or later-staged companies has 
increased rapidly. Figure 2 describes this trend in the venture investment. In 2001, 
expansion-staged firms account for only 24.6 percent of new venture investment, but 
in 2005, they represent 55 percent of new investment. During the same period, the 
proportion of new investment toward early-staged firms has promptly decreased 
from 54.4 percent to 15.8 percent.  
 
 
3. Data 
 
 
In Korea, each venture capital firm registered at SMBA (Small and Medium 
Business Administration) has an obligation to report full information on its 
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businesses to the KVCA. The information on the venture capital firms’ businesses 
collected by the KVCA includes following categories: ① information on each venture 
capital firm’s registration date, major stock holders, composition of inside fund, and 
the number of employees; ② information on each outside fund such as organization 
date, size, life span, the number of partners, each partner’s capital commitment, 
managerial compensation rule, performance compensation rule, and the order of 
making up loss; ③ transaction data for each invested company such as transaction 
date, transaction amount, transaction type,8 and investment type;9 ④ information on 
each invested company such as registration date, region, type of business, the 
number of employees, and financial information including paid-in capital, sales, 
profit. 
Among those categories, data in the second and third categories are mainly used 
for the analysis. Raw data from the KVCA include 164 venture capital firms, 636 
outside funds, 9,947 invested firms, and 39,511 transactions. After excluding 
observations which have missing or miscoding values in the main variables, 109 
venture capital firms and 601 outside funds are included in the dataset for the 
empirical analysis in Section 4 and 100 venture capital firms, 290 outside funds, 4,663 
invested firms, and 12,530 investments are used for the analysis in Section 5. 
In Section 4, for each of 601 outside funds, the amounts of capital committed by 
the Korean government, venture capital firms, and private investors are computed to 
evaluate the government’s role in the fund-raising stage. In Section 5, where an 
examination on the role of the government in the investment stage is conducted, for 
each outside fund, the size, shares of capital committed by the government and a 
venture capital firm, concentration ratio of investment by industry and by region,10 
average value of shares of a fund in invested firms, average age of invested firms, 
ratio of common stock investment, and ratio of money invested in high-tech 
industries, high- and medium-tech industries11 are computed. In addition, the same 
variables at the venture capital firm level are also computed for the comparison of 
investment behaviors between inside fund and outside funds in Section 5.2. Along 
with those computed variables, several dummy variables representing the 
characteristics of venture capital firms and outside funds, and stipulated huddle 
rates12 and life-spans of outside funds are used in the empirical analysis. Table 6 
provides the definitions and summary statistics of main variables used in the 
analysis in Sections 4 and 5.  
                                            
8 Transaction types include venture investment, retrieval of investment, and reduction of investment. 
9 Venture investment is classified by its object: common stock; preferred stock; convertible bond; bond 
with warranty; and project financing.  
10 For a detailed explanation on the computation of concentration ratio of investment by industry and by 
region, see Appendix. 
11 In the paper, any ‘average’ value of variable is a weighted average using the amount of investment in 
each invested firm as a weight. 
12 When organizing an outside fund, a venture capital firm defines a target rate of return which is called a 
‘huddle rate’. A typical outside fund is organized in such a way that a venture capital firm has no claim on 
earnings realized within a specified huddle rate in order to give the venture capital firm an incentive to 
make an effort to make considerable earnings.  
 
 
 
<Table 6> Definition and Summary Statistics of Variables 
 Variables Def. # obs. Mean Std. Max Min 
privateij Size of capital committed by private investors in outside fund j ($ million) 208 5.85 5.91 40.5 0 
goij Size of capital committed by the government in outside fund j ($ million) 208 4.08 4.48 40 0.3 
vcij Size of capital committed by venture capital firm i in outside fund j ($ million) 208 1.76 1.59 10 0 
Section 4  
Fund-raising 
repij Registration date of outside fund j – registration date of venture capital firm i (year) 208 5.82 5.63 19.8 0.3 
lengthij Dummy, 1 if the stipulated life span of outside fund j is longer than 5 years 288 0.13 0.34 1 0 
repij Registration date of outside fund j – registration date of venture capital firm i (year)  288 5.63 5.26 18.75 0.08 
size(O)ij Size of outside fund j ($ million) 286 11.57 9.33 77.60 0.99 
hrateij Huddle rate of outside fund j (%) 288 10.96 4.76 0 30 
s_vcij Share of venture capital firm i’s commitment in the committed capital of outside fund j (%) 286 18.16 12.34 70 0 
s_go1ij
Share of commitment of SMBA (and Fund of funds) in the committed capital of outside fund j 
(%) 
286 15.77 17.94 94.66 0 
hhi_inv(O)ij Concentration ratio of investment by industry (HHI) 288 0.43 0.22 1 0.13 
hhi_reg(O)ij Concentration ratio of investment by region (HHI) 288 0.57 0.23 1 0.24 
ave_age(O)ij Average age of invested firms (year)  288 3.18 1.55 11.24 0.06 
r_m1(O)ij Ratio of money invested in high-tech industries   288 0.34 0.25 0.92 0 
r_m12(O)ij Ratio of money invested in high- and medium-tech industries 288 0.45 0.29 1 0 
r_cs(O)ij Ratio of common stock investment 288 0.55 0.33 1 0 
Section 5.1 
Investment 
behaviors of 
outside funds 
share(O)ij Average value of shares of outside fund j in invested firms (%)  260 11.89 10.48 83.33 1.24 
 
 
 
 
 Variables Def. # obs. Mean Std. Max Min 
ave_age(I) i Average age of invested firms in inside fund of venture capital firm i (year) 76 2.95 0.97 5.63 0.93 
ave_age(O) Average age of invested firms in outside funds of venture capital firm i (year) 76 3.11 0.97 6.09 1.34 
d(ave_age) i ave_age(I) i - ave_age(O) i 76 -0.16 1.10 2.12 -3.01 
r_m1(I) i Ratio of money invested in high-tech industries in inside fund of venture capital firm i 76 0.33 0.17 0.78 0 
r_m1(O) i Ratio of money invested in high-tech industries in outside funds of venture capital firm i 76 0.30 0.19 0.66 0 
r(r_m1) i r_m1(I) i - r_m1(O) i 76 0.03 0.17 0.42 -0.44 
r_m12(I) i
Ratio of money invested in high- and medium-tech industries in inside fund of venture capital 
firm i 
76 0.43 0.20 0.84 0.02 
r_m12(O) i
Ratio of money invested in high- and medium-tech industries in outside funds of venture 
capital firm i 
76 0.41 0.22 0.84 0 
d(r_m12) i r_m12(I) i - r_m12(O) i 76 0.02 0.20 0.54 -0.32 
r_cs(I) i Ratio of common stock investment in inside fund of venture capital firm i 76 0.79 0.19 1 0.09 
r_cs(O) i Ratio of common stock investment in outside fund of venture capital firm i 76 0.52 0.24 1 0.02 
d(r_cs) i r_cs(I) i - r_cs(O) i 76 0.26 0.27 0.92 -0.47 
Section 5.2 
Comparison 
between inside 
funds and 
outside funds 
r_invi Ratio of total size of outside funds to the size of inside fund of venture capital firm i 76 3.47 4.79 28.25 0.12 
<Table 6> Continued 
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In the paper, empirical analyses in Section 4 and Section 5.1 will be conducted 
separately for each period of venture boom and post-boom, and analyses in Section 
5.2 and Appendix use the full sample without any distinction of periods 
 
 
4. Fund-raising and the Role of the Government 
 
 
This section investigates, the role of the Korean government in the fund-raising 
stage. In a situation where the venture capital industry is still underdeveloped and 
the amount of venture capital committed by the private sector is far below what is 
needed, the role of a government to increase the amount of venture capital by 
committing its capital or providing the private sector with incentives to invest in 
venture capital is considered very important. In Korea, the government has 
participated in various outside funds and committed a significant amount of public 
capital. In many cases, the Korean government also drew private investors to the 
fund-raising process by increasing the expected rate of return for the private 
investors by means of setting an upper limit on the rate of return for its share (and 
/or) allowing its share to be used foremost when covering potential losses. 
Considering those facts, the role of Korean government in the fund-raising process is 
evaluated in aspects of the size of government capital commitments, and the private 
sector’s responsiveness to the government capital commitments to the outside funds. 
 
 
4.1 Size of the Government Capital Commitments  
 
The following table shows the size of government capital commitment and its 
share in outside funds made during the venture boom and after the boom. Variable 
go represents the amount of capital invested by the Korean government including 
the SMBA and the Fund of funds. During the venture boom the government 
invested about $0.3 billion and represented 16.9 percent of the total outside funds. In 
the same period, general corporations accounted for 30.1 percent of the capital raised 
and individual investors provided 17.2 percent. After the boom, facing with an 
abrupt contraction of venture capital commitments from the private sector, the 
government expanded its role significantly. The government participated in 173 out 
of 309 outside funds made during the post-boom period and committed $0.7 billion 
in total. This amount represented 24.4 percent of the capital raised during the same 
period and the government became the largest stakeholder in outside funds. In 
particular, for the outside funds with government participation, its share amounted 
to 38.0 percent followed by 16.5 percent of general corporations. With the end of the 
venture boom, the shares of general corporations and individual investors rapidly 
declined. Instead, pension funds have widened their presence in outside funds, 
providing 13.9 percent of the capital raised after the venture boom.  
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<Table 7> Size and Share of the Government Capital Commitment 
(Unit: $100 million, %) 
Venture Boom Post-boom 
Partner Type 
go>0[92]a go=0[177] Total[269] go>0[173] go=0[136] Total[309] 
Government 2.95(34.3)b 0(0.0) 2.95(16.9) 6.95(38.0) 0(0.0) 6.95(24.4) 
VC firms 1.52(17.7) 1.38(15.5) 2.90(16.6) 2.63(14.4) 1.48(14.5) 4.12(14.4) 
Institutional Investors 0.52(6.0) 1.79(20.1) 2.31(13.2) 2.03(11.1) 1.76(17.3) 3.79(13.3) 
Corporations 2.02(23.5) 3.25(36.5) 5.27(30.1) 3.02(16.5) 3.35(32.9) 6.38(22.4) 
Pension Funds 0.14(1.6) 0.10(1.1) 0.24(1.4) 2.09(11.4) 1.88(18.5) 3.97(13.9) 
Individuals 0.78(9.0) 2.23(25.1) 3.01(17.2) 0.51(2.8) 1.18(11.5) 1.69(5.9) 
Local Gov. 0.03(0.3) 0.02(0.2) 0.05(0.3) 0.25(1.4) 0.22(2.1) 0.47(1.6) 
Foreigners 0.65(7.5) 0.14(1.5) 0.78(4.5) 0.82(4.5) 0.33(3.2) 1.15(4.0) 
Total 8.61(100) 8.90(100) 17.51(100) 18.31(100) 10.21(100) 28.52(100) 
Note: a. Numbers in [ ] denote the number of outside funds in each group. 
b. Numbers in ( ) denote the shares of each partner type.  
 
 
4.2 Private Sector’s Responsiveness to the Government Capital 
Commitments  
 
In addition to committing capital, the government also assists venture capital 
firms to organize outside funds by drawing private investors into the fund-raising 
process. One way of examining this aspect of the government’s role is to see the 
responsiveness of private sector’s venture capital commitments to the government 
capital commitments in outside funds. Figure 3 describes time-series movements of 
the size of capital commitments by the government and private investors, which are 
aggregated in outside funds. Figure 3-A is drawn with all outside funds made 
during a given year and Figure 3-B includes only outside funds with the government 
participation. Figure 3-A reveals that the capital commitments from the private 
sector moves together with the government capital commitments and this 
co-movement pattern becomes more apparent when considering only outside funds 
in which the government participated. In Korea, it was usually observed, in 
particular, after the ending of venture boom that a venture capital firm, when it 
planned to organize an outside fund, tried to obtain capital from the government 
first, and then went to the private sector to raise private capital with a leverage of 
capital committed by the government. Considering this common pattern of the 
fund-raising process, the co-movement between the sizes of capital coming from the 
government and the private investors during the post-boom period can be 
interpreted as a strong positive causality relationship from the government capital 
commitments to the private sector’s capital commitments. That is, the capital  
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[Figure 3] Sizes of Capital Committed from Private Investors and the Government 
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committed by the government not only directly increased the size of outside funds, 
but also helped venture capital firms by attracting private investors to the 
fund-raising process in the post-boom period. Concerning the venture boom period, 
however, the co-movement between the two variables may not be interpreted 
strongly as a causality relationship. During the years of 1998-2000, the amount of 
private capital committed to the outside funds had drastically increased regardless of 
the government participation as shown in Figure 3-C, thereby creating a ‘boom’.13 
Taking the aspects of ‘boom’ into account, it may be misleading to interpret the 
co-movement between the capital commitments by the government and the private 
investors during the venture boom period totally as a causality relationship. Instead, 
a significant part of the co-movement observed during the venture period in Figure 
3-A will represent a simple correlation between the two variables. This kind of 
reservation in interpretation may also be kept in regards to the co-movement 
between the relevant variables in Figure 3-B.    
Since Figure 3 only describes time-series movements of the two aggregate 
variables without any conditioning, it may not be convincing enough to draw a 
                                            
13 In fact, as Figure 3-D describes, in the venture boom period the amount of private capital committed to 
the outside funds with no government participation was much bigger than the amount of private capital in 
the outside funds where the government participated. 
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concrete relationship between the two variables. Now, a regression equation is 
constructed to explain the size of capital commitments by the private investors at the 
fund level for each period of the venture boom and post-boom. The regression 
equation for the venture boom period is as follows:  
ij
k
ijkijijijij yearkindustryrepvcgoprivate 99)( 7
2
0
43210 αααααα +++++= ∑
=
+   
ijij uyear ++ 008α                                       (1) 
 
where privateij, goij, and vcij are the sizes of capital committed by the private investors, 
government, and venture capital firm i, respectively, in outside fund j organized by 
venture capital firm i. repij is an interval between the registration date of fund j and 
the registration date of venture capital firm i and is assumed to represent the 
reputation of venture capital firm i when organizing outside fund j. industry(0)ij, 
industry(1)ij, and industry(2)ij are dummy variables indicating whether venture capital 
firm i stipulated culture and media-related industry, bio-related industry, and IT 
industry, respectively, as a main target for its investment when organizing outside 
fund j. year99ij and year00ij are year dummies indicating the registration date of fund j. 
Finally, uij is a mean-zero stochastic term representing either measurement error or a 
fund-specific shock unobservable to econometricians. A regression equation for the 
post-boom period is also constructed in the same way as Equation (1) substituting 
the year dummies of year99 and year00 with year dummies of year02, year03, year04, 
year05, and year06. 
Those equations are estimated using the outside funds where the government 
participated.14 Table 8 summarizes the estimation results. For simplicity, coefficient 
estimates of industry dummies and year dummies are abbreviated from the table. 
Regression results show that the government participation in outside funds has been 
an effective device in attracting private investors into the fund-raising process of 
outside funds during the post-boom period. 15  The coefficient estimate of  
                                            
14 In general, this kind of regression analysis is likely to be plagued by a selection bias, i.e., for a given 
outside fund, the size of capital committed by private investors and that by the government may depend 
on common unobservables. Considering the fund-raising process by a venture capital firm, however, it is 
very hard to control the selection bias problem considered here. A given venture capital firm submits a 
fund make-up proposal to the government and the government decides on its participation to the 
proposed fund. If the government decides not to participate, the proposed fund may have to raise its total 
amount of capital planned from the private sector, or the proposal may be given up totally. Furthermore, 
while raising private capitals, some funds are often combined with other funds to reach a certain level of 
size. Therefore, all ex ante proposed funds are not observed ex post. This means that we may not deal with 
the selection bias problem in a convincing way when measuring the impacts of the government capital 
commitments on the private investors’ capital commitments. Because of this difficulty, simply OLS method 
was used to estimate Equation (1) despite the possible existence of selection bias problem. 
15 A referee points out a possible existence of crowding-out effect, i.e., the amount of private capital 
committed to a specific outside fund may increase with the government participation without any change 
in the total amount of private capital committed to the venture capital industry in a given year. Because of 
the characteristic of fund-raising process mentioned in the previous note, it is also very hard to detect the 
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<Table 8> Estimation Results of Responsiveness of Private Sector 
Private 
Venture Boom Post Boom Variablea
Coef. (t-value) Coef. (t-value) 
go   1.663(5.11)***b   0.926(6.83)*** 
vc -0.043(-0.12) -0.215(-0.75) 
rep -0.119(-1.28)   -0.126(-2.29)** 
Adj. R-squared 0.6553 0.7415 
# of obs. 76 132 
Note: a. Coefficient estimates of year dummies and industry dummies are abbreviated from the table. 
b. ** and *** indicate that a coefficient estimate is statistically different from zero at the significance 
level of 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
go in the post-boom period amounts to 0.926, which means that each $1 commitment 
from the government induced private sector’s commitment of $0.926 at maximum 
during this period.16  In the venture boom period, we also obtained a positive 
coefficient estimate of go. However, we need to be more cautious in interpreting this 
estimate result. As previously explained in this subsection, during the venture boom 
period a significant amount of the private capital invested in the outside funds 
where the government committed capital might move responding to the market 
condition, i.e., a ‘boom’ rather than responding to the government participation. 
With currently available data, it is very difficult to distinguish precisely the effect of 
the government capital commitment on the private venture investment during the 
venture boom from the effect of the market condition. Another finding from the 
tableis that the variable rep, which is assumed to represent the reputation of a 
venture capital firm organizing an outside fund, is negatively related to the size of 
private capital commitments into the outside fund. Considering the maturity or 
reputation of a venture capital firm has been identified as the most significant 
determinant of the size of funds in previous literature on the U.S. venture capital 
                                                                                                               
existence of crowding-out effect from the fund-level data. Considering this difficulty, I just mention that 
the annual aggregate amount of private capital committed to the venture capital industry has co-moved 
very closely with the annual amount of the government capital commitments, as shown in Figure 3-A. 
Between 1994 and 2006, the correlation coefficient between the two aggregate variables amounts to 0.8283. 
For a reference, the correlation coefficients between the two aggregate variables in Figure 3-B and Figure 
3-C are 0.9840 and 0.6174, respectively.   
16 The terminology of ‘at maximum’ was used considering the coefficient estimate of go may not be 
interpreted as purely representing the ‘responsiveness’ of private sector to the government capital 
commitment because a selection bias may possibly exists. If a selection bias is present, only some portion of 
coefficient estimate would represent the ‘responsiveness’ and the remaining part should be interpreted as 
representing a ‘correlation’ between the government’ and private sector’s capital commitments.  
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industry,17 the negative coefficient of rep implies that the venture capital industry in 
Korea is not stabilized yet and still in an underdeveloped stage.18
In summary, the data tell us that the government has provided a significant 
amount of capital to venture capital firms for their venture investments since 1998 
and this direct role of the government seems to have been expanded after the 
venture boom. The government also played an effective role in attracting private 
investors’ capital in the post-boom period.  
 
 
5. Venture Investment and the Role of Government 
 
 
This section, which is a crucial part of this paper, evaluates the role of the Korean 
government in the investment stage. At first, Section 5.1 analyzes the investment 
behaviors of venture capital firms in Korea on outside funds at the fund level. Focus 
will be put on the effects of government capital commitment on the investment 
behaviors of outside funds and a hypothesis explaining empirical outcomes is 
suggested. The examination is conducted separately for each of venture boom and 
post-boom period. Section 5.2 compares the investment behaviors between inside 
funds and outside funds at the venture capital firm level and further attempts to find 
evidence on the hypothesis suggested in the previous subsection. 
 
 
5.1 Government Participation and Changes in the Investment Behaviors 
of Outside Funds 
 
As shown in Section 4, in a situation where the venture capital industry is still 
underdeveloped, the role of government in the fund-raising stage can be clearly 
stipulated as increasing fund capitalization by directly committing capital or 
attracting private sector’s investment, and therefore it is somewhat straightforward 
to evaluate the role played by the government in the fund-raising stage. On the 
investment stage, however, it is not clear to outline the role of government since 
investment activities are done by venture capitalists, and not by the government. 
Nevertheless, we may stipulate several roles for the government with respect to the 
investment activities if we consider that the government has an objective to develop 
the venture capital industry itself rather than maximizing the rate of return from the 
venture investment like other limited partners. Following the definition of venture 
capital given in Gompers & Lerner (2001), 19  the following activities are 
                                            
17 Gompers & Lerner (1998).  
18 The negative coefficient of rep should be interpreted with reservation since rep may not be an 
appropriate measure for the reputation of a venture capital firm. The reputation of a venture capital firm 
may be measured more properly by its history of track record. But, data on the track records are not 
available for an empirical analysis, even though private investors may have an access to that kind of 
information before committing capital to outside funds.  
19 “Venture capital has developed as an important intermediary in financial markets, providing capital to 
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<Table 9> Investment Behaviors of Outside Funds: Comparison of Venture Boom 
vs. Post-boom 
Variable Venture boom (1998-2000) 
Post venture 
boom (2001-) Diff. p-value 
ave_age(O) 2.594 3.706 1.113 0.000 
r_cs(O) 0.757 0.344 -0.413 0.000 
r_m1(O) 0.343 0.344 0.001 0.973 
r_m12(O) 0.443 0.467 0.024 0.482 
 
suggested as the role of a government that tries to develop the venture capital 
industry in the investment stage, though those are not undisputable: ① the 
government draws venture capitalists’ investment toward earlier-staged firms which 
are plagued by high levels of informational asymmetry and uncertainty (ave_age); ② 
the government guides more venture investments toward industries of which 
markets change very rapidly such as high- and medium-tech industries (r_m1, 
r_m12)20; and ③ the government induces a common stock investment of venture 
capitalists, thereby giving the venture capitalists incentives to engage actively in the 
management activities of invested firms (r_cs).21
Table 9 describes the trends of the above four variables since 1998. It also 
tabulates the results of t-test analysis for those variables. For the t-test analysis, 
outside funds organized during the venture boom were compared with those 
organized after the boom. If we assume that a major part of committed capital of an 
outside fund is invested within a year after the formation, the results of the t-test 
analysis tell us that the average age of invested firms (ave_age(O)) has significantly 
increased and the ratio of common stock investment (r_cs(O)) decreased very 
significantly after the boom burst. Larger values of ave_age(O) and smaller values of 
r_cs(O) in the post-boom period commonly reflect the fact that venture capital firms 
avoided risky projects after experiencing the venture boom and its abrupt ending, 
which is a generally accepted view on the venture capital industry in Korea.22 The 
                                                                                                               
firms that might otherwise have difficulty attracting financing. These firms are typically small and young, 
plagued by high level of uncertainty… Moreover, these firms… operate in markets that change very 
rapidly. Venture capital organizations finance these high-risk, potentially high-reward projects, purchasing 
equity or equity-linked stakes…” (Gompers & Lerner, 2001) 
20 The classification of manufacturing industries by technology level follows OECD (2005) 
21 Beside the variables ave_age(O), r_m1(O), r_m12(O), r_cs(O), there are other variables which are assumed 
to summarize the investment behaviors of venture capital firms, even though they may not be directly 
related to the government’s objective of developing a venture capital industry. Those may include the 
concentration ratio of investment by industry (hhi_inv(O)), by region (hhi_reg(O)), and the average value of 
shares of an outside fund in invested firms (share(O)). The Appendix investigates outside funds in respect 
to those variables. 
22 These changing patterns are exactly opposite from the government’s objectives. However, it would be 
very difficult even for the government who came out to be the largest stakeholder of outside funds in the 
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ratios of investment in high-tech industries (r_m1(O)) and in high- and medium-tech 
industries (r_m12(O)) are not statistically different between the venture boom period 
and post-boom period.  
Table 10 compares the investment behaviors between outside funds in which the 
government made capital commitment and outside funds with no government 
capital commitment for each period of venture boom and post-boom. Group 1 
consists of outside funds whose value of s_go1 is zero. Group 2 are composed of 
outside funds whose value of s_go1 is positive.  
If the government makes effort in the investment stage to accomplish its goal of 
developing the venture capital industry, we may expect to obtain a smaller value of 
ave_age(O) and larger values of r_cs(O), r_m1(O), and r_m12(O) in the second group 
for each period.23 Contrary to the expectation, however, the table reports that the 
average age of invested firms in Group 2 is significantly higher than that in Group 1. 
The ratio of common stock investment also has lower values when the government 
has stakes in outside funds. These unexpected patterns, however, disappeared after 
the venture boom even though the average values of ave_age(O) and r_cs(O) in 
Group 2 are not still statistically different from those in Group 1. These results may 
indicate that the government did not play its expected role and rather played in the 
opposite direction with respect to the variables ave_age(O) and r_cs(O) during the 
venture boom period, and that there have been some policy improvements 
regarding those variables after the boom burst. 
Concerning the ratios of investment in the high-tech and high- and medium-tech 
industries, the situation is opposite to what has been seen regarding the variables 
ave_age(O) and r_cs(O). During the venture boom period, the group with the 
government capital commitments had higher values of r_m1(O) and r_m12(O), 
though the value of each variable is not statistically different between the two groups. 
After the boom burst, however, the two variables have changed in the opposition 
direction from what was expected, resulting in significantly lower values in Group 2 
in both variables. These results may also imply that the government is not working 
properly in leading the venture investment towards the high- and medium-tech 
industries.  
Table 10 provides several indications of government policy failure in the 
investment stage, but it simply compared investment behaviors between two groups 
without controlling any other variables which may affect the compared variables.24  
                                                                                                               
post-boom period to go against that stream of changes in investment behaviors. 
23 The government may accomplish its goal by guiding venture capitalists’ investment activities to the 
direction of its objective with implicit or explicit contracts with venture capital firms when committing 
capital.     
24 The comparison results in Table 10 may reflect other underlying effects rather than implying a policy 
failure. For example, the following chain of logics may work in deriving the observed patterns in the table: 
a higher level of s_go1 → a larger size of outside fund → a bigger amount of investment per project → a 
higher value of ave_age(O) and a lower value of r_cs(O). The first two arrows are supported by the data. 
The last is generally accepted as true. A bigger amount of investment per project is usually related to 
relatively big-sized companies of which a venture capitalist may not have any strong incentives to engage 
in the management process, which directly results in a lower level of r_cs(O). Also, a big-sized company is 
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<Table 10> Role of Government in the Investment Stage: Venture Boom vs. 
Post-boom 
s_go1 = 0 vs. s_go1 > 0 
Variable Period Group1 
s_go1 = 0 
Group2 
s_go1 > 0 Diff. p-value 
Venture boom 2.319 3.030 0.711 0.002 
ave_age(O) 
Post-boom 3.730 3.687 -0.043 0.869 
Venture boom 0.863 0.587 -0.276 0.000 
r_cs(O) 
Post-boom 0.327 0.358 0.030 0.501 
Venture boom 0.334 0.358 0.024 0.571 
r_m1(O) 
Post-boom 0.402 0.295 -0.107 0.015 
Venture boom 0.426 0.468 0.042 0.372 
r_m12(O) 
Post-boom 0.522 0.421 0.101 0.055 
 
Now, in order to evaluate the role of government in the investment stage, for each of 
the above four variables, and for each period of venture boom and post-boom, a 
linear equation is constructed as follows: 
 
ijijijijij repOscdindustryindustrydep 43210 )()1()0( βββββ ++++=  
ijijijij gosdvcshrateOsize )1_(_)( 8765 ββββ ++++  
ij
i
iiij eDlength +++ ∑ +99 ββ                               (2) 
 
where industry(0)ij and industry(1)ij are dummies indicating whether the stipulated 
main industries of investment outside fund j are culture- and media-related, or 
biotechnology-related, respectively; scd(O)ij is a dummy indicating whether outside 
fund j is secondary25; size(O)ij is a total amount of capital committed into outside 
fund j; hrateij is a huddle rate of outside fund j; s_vcij is a share of venture capital firm 
i in the committed capital of outside fund j; and d(s_go1)ij is a dummy indicating 
whether a share of the SMBA and the Fund of funds is positive. lengthij is a dummy 
indicating whether the stipulated life span of outside fund j is more than 5 years. Di’s 
are dummies aimed at capturing firm-specific effect. Finally, eij is a mean-zero 
stochastic term representing either measurement error or a fund-specific shock 
unobservable to econometricians.  
                                                                                                               
usually at the stage of expansion or later, which gives us a higher level of ave_age(O). Therefore, a simple 
comparison such as in Table 10 does not give us a convincing answer to the main forces driving the higher 
value of ave_age(O) and the lower value of r_cs(O) in Gruop 2 during the venture boom period. 
25 A secondary fund purchases venture firms’ stock owned by other venture funds rather than initially 
investing in venture firms, thereby it helps the exit process of other venture funds. 
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Table 11 reports the estimation results of those equations, in particular, the net 
effect of d(s_go1) on the investment behaviors after controlling the effects of 
industry(0), industry(1), scd(O), rep, size(O), hrate, s_vc, and length variables. The 
coefficient estimate of d(s_go1) in the regression of ave_age(O) during the venture 
boom, is positive and significant at 5% significance level. This confirms the 
implication from Table 10 that the government did not play an expected role 
regarding the ages of invested firms when it made capital commitments during the 
venture boom. On the contrary, after the boom, the opposite impacts of d(s_go1) on 
the level of ave_age(O) disappeared resulting in insignificant coefficient estimate of 
d(s_go1). 26  Instead, the dummy variable indicating whether an outside fund is 
secondary, the maturity of a venture capital firm that organizes fund, and the size of 
fund are found to be the main determinants in the average age of invested firms. The 
same pattern follows for the variable r_cs(O). The estimation result tells us that the 
capital commitment of the government in outside fund lowers the ratio of common 
stock investment rather than increasing it in the venture boom period. This opposite 
impacts of d(s_go1) also disappeared during the post-boom period. 
For the ratios of investment in the high-tech industries (r_m1(O)), the negative 
relationship between the variables d(s_go1) and r_m1(O) during the post-boom period 
found in the previous table still remains as true when controlling other variables. 
However, the negative relationship between the variables d(s_go1) and r_m12(O) 
during the post-boom period found in the previous table does not hold when other 
independent variables are controlled. The table reports that the ratios of investment of 
outside fund in the high-tech and high- and medium-tech industries are basically 
determined by the dummy variables indicating whether the stipulated main industries 
of investment of the fund are culture- and media-related, or biotechnology-related.27  
The finding that variable industry(0), a dummy indicating whether the stipulated 
main industries of investment of the fund are culture- and media-related has  
                                            
26 A referee points out that the empirical strategy employed in the paper makes it impossible to test a 
structural break in the relationship between the government participation and the investment behaviors of 
outside funds because the regression analyses are conducted separately for each period of venture boom 
and post-boom. Although his opinion is right, the interest of this paper also lies in the possible breaks in 
the relationships between other independent variables and the investment behaviors of outside funds, as 
well, hence the empirical strategy presented here will be kept. In fact, the referee’s suggestion was 
followed and each of the four equations was estimated using the full sample with an interaction term of 
time dummy (for post-boom period) and d(s_go1). The estimation results reject the null hypothesis that 
there is no structural break in the relationship between the government participation and the investment 
behaviors of outside funds in the aspects of ave_age(O) and r_cs(O) at 5% significance level. Also the same 
results are found when using s_go1 instead of d(s_go1) as an explanatory variable.  
27 In the sample, the proportions of outside funds of which stipulated main targets of investment are 
culture- and media-related industries, are 7.8 percent (10 out of 127) and 27.5 percent (41 out of 149), 
respectively, during the venture boom period and post-boom period. The weighted average values of r_m1 
of those outside funds amount to 0.37 and 0.36 during the venture boom and post-boom period, 
respectively. Even though those values are lower than the average values of r_ml of other outside funds 
(0.50 and 0.56, respectively), it may be difficult to say that the estimation results reported in Tables 11 and 
12 are derived mainly by the inclusion of those outside funds in the sample.    
 
 
 
ave_age(O) r_cs(O) r_m1(O) r_m12(O) 
Venture Boom Post Boom Venture Boom Post Boom Venture Boom Post Boom Venture Boom Post Boom Variable 
Coef. (t-value) Coef. (t-value) Coef. (t-value) Coef. (t-value) Coef. (t-value) Coef. (t-value) Coef. (t-value) Coef. (t-value) 
industry(0) -0.430(-1.23) -0.417(-1.39) -0.353(-4.86)*** -0.345(-7.48)*** -0.223(-3.20)*** -0.408(-11.37)*** -0.325(-4.22)*** -0.518(-12.41)*** 
industry(1) -0.760(-3.54)***a 0.060(0.15) 0.134(2.37)** -0.080(-0.90) 0.308(7.53)*** -0.030(-0.27) 0.259(4.90)*** -0.138(-1.02) 
scd(O)  3.017(4.77)***  0.526(10.10)***  0.124(0.64)  0.124(0.68) 
rep 0.032(1.63) 0.052(2.07)** -0.001(-0.30) -0.002(-0.31) 0.004(0.90) -0.004(-1.02) 0.007(1.39) 0.006(1.30) 
size(O) 0.012(1.15) 0.030(3.45)*** 0.002(0.82) -0.002(-0.98) 0.003(1.47) 0.003(1.79)* 0.004(1.61) 0.001(0.29) 
hrate 0.063(2.48)** -0.051(-1.28) -0.003(-0.63) 0.004(0.54) 0.004(0.77) 0.005(0.68) 0.006(0.93) 0.004(0.31) 
s_vc -0.009(-1.15) -0.008(-0.85) 0.001(0.79) 0.003(2.12)** -0.000(-0.12) 0.002(0.84) -0.001(-0.64) 0.001(0.50) 
d(s_go1) 0.586(2.59)** -0.020(-0.11) -0.241(-5.16)*** 0.033(0.96) 0.030(0.52) -0.063(-2.01)** 0.070(1.12) -0.047(-1.22) 
length -0.429(-1.11) -0.302(-1.07)       
Adj. 
R-squared 
0.7824 0.6430 0.8749 0.8510 0.7589 0.8012 0.7558 0.8831 
# of obs. 122 144 122 146 125 142 125 146 
Note: a. *, **, and *** indicate that a coefficient estimate is statistically different from zero at the significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
<Table 11> Estimation Results of Investment Behaviors of Outside Funds (Ⅰ) 
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negative impacts on r_m1(O) and r_m12(O), is an expected one considering that the 
culture- and media-related industries are not high-tech or high- and medium-tech 
industries in general. Since an investment into the culture- and media-related 
industries usually takes the form of project financing rather than common stock 
investment, the variable industry(0) also has a negative impact on r_cs(O).  
In regards of variable industry(1), a dummy indicating whether the stipulated 
main industries of investment of the fund are bio-related, it is expected to have 
positive impacts on r_m1(O) and r_m12(O) because the bio-related industries are 
classified as high-tech industries. Estimation outcomes saying that the variable 
industry(1) has no impact on r_m1(O) and r_m12(O) in the period of post-boom, seem 
to indicate that outside funds whose stipulated industries were bio-related were not 
invested as stipulated during the post-boom period. 28  A negative impact on 
ave_age(O) of industry(1) and a positive impact on r_cs(O) in the venture boom period 
seem to tell us that outside funds stipulated to invest mainly to the bio-related 
industries took the risk more aggressively during the venture boom.29  
Positive coefficient estimates of scd(O) in the regressions of ave_age(O) and r_cs(O) 
are expected from the definition of secondary fund. A positive impact of size(O) on 
ave_age(O) in the post-boom period may be explained by the logic provided in the 
previous note 24. On the contrary, it is not clear to interpret a positive impact of rep 
on ave_age(O) in the post-boom period. It may reflect a changed recognition after the 
boom that only a small number of firms could be qualified for the investment from a 
conservatively changed view of venture capitalists. In this situation, well-qualified 
firms in the expansion or later stage might have a power to choose venture capital 
firms to invest to them and they chose experienced venture capital firms rather than 
newly-established ones.     
Equation (2) is re-estimated with a substitution of d(s_go1) with s_go1 in order to see 
how the investment behaviors of venture capitalists change according as the level of 
s_go1 increase.30 The estimation results are summarized in Table 12 and they are 
very similar qualitatively to the results in the previous table. As shown in the table, 
the average age of invested firms was increasing and the ratio of common stock 
investment was decreasing as the share of the government in outside fund increased 
                                            
28 In the post-boom period, out of 149 outside funds, four funds were stipulated to mainly invest to the 
bio-related industries. Although their values of r_m1 and r_m12 are a little bit higher than those of other 
funds on average, their values of r_m1 and r_m12 are distributed broadly over the range of 0.07 and 0.83 
and the range of 0.19 and 0.90, respectively. These distribution patterns are not significantly different from 
those for other outside funds. 
29 In the venture boom period, out of 127 outside funds, seven funds were stipulated to mainly invest to 
the bio-related industries. Their average values of ave_age(O) and r_cs(O) were 1.74 and 0.89, respectively, 
and those values for other outside funds were 2.64 and 0.75. 
30 To see how the investment behaviors change with an increase in s_go1, it would be more appropriate to 
use only outside funds whose value of s_go1 is positive in the regression analysis rather than including all 
observations to the analysis. However, the number of outside funds whose value of s_go1 is positive in the 
venture boom period is just 56, which is relatively too small for a credible estimation result. Considering 
this difficulty, in the paper the analysis with all outside funds was conducted even though it may not be 
conceptually correct.       
 
 
 
ave_age(O) r_cs(O) r_m1(O) r_m12(O) 
Venture Boom Post Boom Venture Boom Post Boom Venture Boom Post Boom Venture Boom Post Boom Variable 
Coef. (t-value) Coef. (t-value) Coef. (t-value) Coef. (t-value) Coef. (t-value) Coef. (t-value) Coef. (t-value) Coef. (t-value) 
industry(0) -0.389(-1.12) -0.421(-1.40) -0.356(-4.73)*** -0.342(-7.53)*** -0.218(-3.05)*** -0.411(-11.37)*** -0.318(-3.98)*** -0.520(-12.51)*** 
industry(1) -0.781(-3.73)***a 0.072(0.18) 0.145(2.67)** -0.086(-0.96) 0.308(7.67)*** -0.025(-0.22) 0.257(4.90)*** -0.133(-0.97) 
scd(O)  2.988(4.69)***  0.540(10.57)***  0.116(0.57)  0.113(0.61) 
rep 0.035(1.77) 0.052(2.08)** -0.002(-0.58) -0.002(-0.38) 0.004(0.92) -0.004(-0.95) 0.007(1.40) 0.006(1.37) 
size(O) 0.014(1.33) 0.030(3.55)*** 0.001(0.65) -0.002(-1.05) 0.003(1.53) 0.003(1.83)* 0.004(1.68)* 0.001(0.35) 
hrate 0.063(2.44)** -0.049(-1.24) -0.003(-0.70) 0.004(0.48) 0.004(0.76) 0.005(0.62) 0.006(0.94) 0.004(0.31) 
s_vc -0.008(-1.03) -0.008(-0.83) 0.001(0.60) 0.003(2.14)** -0.000(-0.04) 0.002(0.82) -0.001(-0.49) 0.001(0.49) 
s_go1 0.015(2.32)** 0.001(0.20) -0.007(-5.14)*** 0.000(0.28) 0.001(0.43) -0.002(-1.88)* 0.002(1.08) -0.001(-0.87) 
length -0.388(-0.98) -0.295(-1.04)       
Adj. 
R-squared 
0.7799 0.6430 0.8710 0.8509 0.7586 0.7981 0.7554 0.8825 
# of obs. 122 144 122 146 125 142 125 146 
Note: a. *, **, and *** indicate that a coefficient estimate is statistically different from zero at the significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
<Table 12> Estimation Results of Investment Behaviors of Outside Funds (Ⅱ) 
236    韓國開發硏究 / 2008. Ⅰ  
 
 
in the venture boom period. The ratio of investment in the high-tech industries 
decreased with an increase in the share of the government in the post-boom period. 
These estimation results can be interpreted as stronger evidences on a hypothesis 
that the government has failed in guiding the venture investments toward firms 
where the government targeted.   
So far, the role of government in the investment stage was evaluated by 
comparing the investment behaviors of outside funds where the government 
committed capital and those of outside funds in which the government did not 
participate. The empirical outcomes indicate that the government failed in inducing 
the investment of outside funds toward earlier-staged companies that were suffering 
from a high level of informational asymmetry and uncertainty and also failed in 
guiding common stock investment, in particular, during the venture boom period. 
The empirical analysis also indicates that the government has not been working 
properly in increasing the venture investment toward the high-tech industries 
during the post-boom period. 
It is not easy to figure out the reason why those undesirable investment behaviors 
from the government’s perspective are observed, in particular, during the venture 
boom period. One plausible scenario is that, although the government wanted to 
develop the venture capital industry, at the same time it may not have the 
willingness to run the risk of losing money during the venture boom period and 
possibly thereafter. As stated in Section 4, the participation of government had been 
crucial in raising the capital of outside funds during the venture boom period. In this 
situation, a venture capital firm may have had an incentive to manage outside fund 
in which the government made a capital commitment relatively safely, thereby 
inviting the government to the fund-raising process successively. Then the 
undesirable investment behaviors are generated. If this has been a case, the 
fundamental reason for those undesirable investment behaviors is that the 
government is setting up two objectives incompatible to each other regarding the 
venture capital industry. By nature of the venture capital itself, running a risk of 
losing money is a basic role required in any participants. Therefore, from the 
perspective of the Korean government engaging in the fund-raising stage very 
actively, the government needs to be more flexible in losing its money in the 
investment process in order to maximize the original function of the venture capital 
investment. Instead, the government should put more resources in selecting 
qualified venture capital firms to invest its budget, monitoring the investment 
activities of selected venture capital firms, and evaluating their performance. 
 
 
5-2 Finding Evidence on the Hypothesis: Comparison of Inside Funds 
and Outside Funds 
 
In the previous subsection, a possible reason was suggested in why undesirable 
investment behaviors from the government’s perspective are observed among 
outside funds where the government committed a significant amount of capital. In 
this subsection, the paper tries to find evidence on the above-mentioned hypothesis 
by comparing the investment behaviors between inside fund and outside funds at 
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the level of venture capital firm. As previously explained, inside funds and outside 
funds are different in respect to funding sources. Whereas inside funds are 
composed of paid-in capital and debt, outside funds are created mainly by external 
investors. In particular, the government has actively participated in outside funds as 
a major investor in Korea. Therefore, if the outside funds of a given venture capital 
firm were managed more conservatively relative to the inside fund as the venture 
capital firm’s dependence on the government increases in the fund-raising process,31 
then we may have an indirect evidence supporting the hypothesis that the venture 
capital firms managed outside funds conservatively in order to invite the 
government to the fund-raising process. 
To proceed with an analysis following the logic suggested above, at first two 
weighted average values for each variable of ave_age, r_cs, r_m1, and r_m12 were 
computed - one for inside fund and the other for outside funds for each of venture 
capital firms.32 Then the following four variables representing the differences in the 
investment behaviors between inside fund and outside funds for a given venture 
capital firm were created: d(ave_age) = ave_age(I) – ave_age(O); d(r_cs) = r_cs(I) – 
r_cs(O); d(r_m1) = r_m1(I) – r_m1(O); d(r_m12) = r_m12(I) – r_m12(O).33 Finally, a 
regression equation to explain the variation of each difference variable at the firm 
level was constructed. a linear relationship is assumed as follows: 
 
iiii vcsvcyearIageaveageaved _)()(_)_( 3210 γγγγ +++=  
iii uinvrgos +++ _1_ 54 γγ               (3)   
    
where year(vc)i is a dummy variable indicating whether venture capital firm i was 
established in or after 1999; s_vci and s_go1i are the shares of venture capital firm i 
and the SMBA and the Fund of funds, respectively, in total amount of capital 
committed to outside funds organized by venture capital firm i; and r_invi is the ratio 
of the total size of outside funds to the size of inside fund of venture capital firm i. ui 
is a mean-zero stochastic term representing either measurement error or a 
fund-specific shock unobservable to econometricians. A variable s_go1 represents a 
venture capital firm’s dependence on the government when organizing outside 
funds. r_inv is also expected to capture indirectly a venture capital firm’s relative 
dependence on the government in the fund-raising process to some degree. A 
dummy variable year(vc) is included in the explanatory variables reflecting a 
possibility that old venture capital firms and newly-established firms may have 
different attitude in managing their inside funds and outside funds.34 For each of 
                                            
31 A venture capital firm’s relative dependence on the government with respect to the fund-raising is 
measured by the share of the government in the total amount of capital committed to the outside funds 
made by the venture capital firm. 
32 Out of 100 venture capital firms in the sample, 24 venture capital firms, of which either an inside fund or 
outside funds in total made investments in less than 10 projects, are excluded from the analysis for a 
credible comparison. 
33 Table 6 provides several moments including average value and standard deviation for each difference 
variable. 
34 Among 76 venture capital firms used for the analysis, 44 firms were established in or after 1999. Venture 
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<Table 13> Estimation Results of Differences in the Investment Behaviors 
d(ave_age) d(r_cs) d(r_m1) d(r_m12) 
Variable 
Coef. (t-value) Coef. (t-value) Coef. (t-value) Coef. (t-value) 
ave_age(I) 0.655(7.03)***a    
r_cs(I)  0.764(4.88)***   
r_m1(I)   0.323(3.34)***  
r_m12(I)    0.388(4.12)*** 
year(vc) 0.476(2.43)** 0.052(0.98) -0.018(-0.45) 0.047(1.03) 
s_vc 0.016(1.81)* -0.000(-0.14) -0.002(-1.21) -0.001(-0.53) 
s_go1 -0.023(-2.51)** 0.007(3.32)*** 0.003(2.14)** 0.001(0.82) 
r_inv -0.045(-1.43) 0.019(2.65)** 0.000(0.04) 0.000(0.03) 
Cons. -2.106(-4.93)*** -0.528(-3.55) -0.082(-1.46) -0.185(-2.65)** 
Adj. R-squared 0.4253 0.4368 0.2242 0.2198 
# of obs. 74 74 71 71 
Note: a. *, **, and *** indicate that a coefficient estimate is statistically different from zero at the significance 
level of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
other difference variables, we can construct a regression equation in the same way as 
Equation (3).35
Table 13 tabulates the estimation results of Equation (3). In all regressions, except 
for the variable d(r_m12), s_go1 has a statistically significant coefficient estimate. As 
the level of s_go1 increases, d(ave_age) decreases. That is, for a given value of the 
average age of portfolio firms in an inside fund, the average age of portfolio firms in 
outside funds is increasing according as the portion of the government capital 
commitment in the total amount of capital of outside funds increases. Dependent 
variables d(r_cs) and d(r_m1) increase with the level of s_go1, saying that the ratio of 
common stock investment and the ratio of money invested in high-tech industries in 
outside funds are decreasing with the share of the government in the outside funds 
for given values of those variables in an inside fund. These estimation results 
                                                                                                               
capital firms established recently might not have enough time to build up networking with private 
investors yet and therefore depended more on the government participation in the fund-raising process. If 
the hypothesis made in the previous subsection is correct, this may lead to relatively more conservative 
management of outside funds among those new venture capital firms compared to old venture capital 
firms.  
35 In Equation (3), the variable ave_age(I) comes in both sides since d(ave_age) is just ave_age(I) minus 
ave_age(O). However, this does not create any problem in the estimation procedure. Equation (3) can be 
easily transformed to an equation explaining the variation of ave_age(O) instead of d(ave_age), and then we 
will have a usual regression equation. 
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commonly tell us that outside funds were managed more conservatively relative to 
inside fund as a venture capital firm’s dependence on the government increases in 
the fund-raising process. Those results can be interpreted as a supporting evidence 
as well on the hypothesis that the venture capital firms managed outside funds 
conservatively in order to invite the government to the fund-raising process 
successively, although those are not directly confirming the hypothesis.  
As a secondary matter, the variable year(vc) does not have any explanatory power 
for the variations of d(r_cs), d(r_m1), and d(r_m12) except for the variable d(ave_age).36 
These regression outcomes contrast with the expectation and say that 
newly-established venture capital firms were not significantly different from old 
venture capital firms in managing their inside and outside funds. Both groups of 
venture capital firms managed outside funds more conservatively than their inside 
funds to a similar degree. On the contrary, the coefficient estimate of variable r_inv 
has an expected positive sign in explaining the variation of d(r_cs). If r_inv can be 
regarded as measuring a venture capital firm’s relative dependence on the 
government in fund-raising to some degree, the positive coefficient estimate of r_inv 
tells us that venture capital firms that relied more on the government, managed their 
outside funds more conservatively relative to their inside funds with respect to the 
common stock investment. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
 
This paper, evaluated the policy effort of the Korean government in developing a 
venture capital industry. The evaluation is conducted in the fund-raising stage and 
investment stage, separately. Also the empirical analyses are conducted for the 
venture boom period and post-boom period separately, considering that there may 
be a structural change in the venture capital industry with the ending of the boom.  
The empirical analyses show that the government played a significant role in the 
fund-raising stage in both periods. The government has provided a significant 
amount of capital to venture capital firms for their venture investments. This direct 
role of the government in the fund-raising stage has been expanded after the venture 
boom, making the government the largest shareholder in outside funds. The 
regression analyses reveal that the government capital commitment has also been an 
effective device to attract private investors’ capital in both periods, even though the 
magnitude of responsiveness of the private sector to the government capital 
commitments declined significantly as the venture boom ended. 
Regarding the role of the government in the investment stage, the empirical 
                                            
36 A positive coefficient estimate for the variable year(vc) in explaining d(ave_age), which is unexpected, 
seems to be caused by the fact that venture capital firms established before 1999, on average, have lower 
values of ave_age(I) and higher values of ave_age(O), compared to venture capital firms established in or 
after 1999. The average values of ave_age(I) and ave_age(O) are 2.90 years and 3.33 years, respectively, for 
the venture capital firms established before 1999, and 3.03 years and 3.25 years for the venture capital firms 
established in or after 1999.   
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results show that the government failed to induce investments of outside funds 
toward earlier-staged firms and to guide common stock investments during the 
venture boom period. Moreover, the investments of a venture capitalist were headed 
the opposite direction from the government’s objective when the government had a 
larger stake in outside funds. This type of policy failure, however, disappeared after 
the boom and data indicate that there has been a policy improvement regarding 
those two criteria. Concerning investments in the high-tech industries, the situation 
is completely opposite. The empirical analysis tells us that the government has not 
worked properly to increase the venture investments toward the high-tech industries 
during the post-boom period, not in the venture boom period. In the previous 
section, a possible scenario which could generate those policy failures observed in 
the investment stage was suggested. According to the scenario, the fundamental 
reason for those policy failures is that the government has had two objectives 
incompatible to each other: developing a venture capital industry vs. avoiding the 
risk of losing money. By nature, when dealing with venture capital, taking the risk 
on losing money is regarded as a necessary premise for a government that is actively 
engaging in the fund-raising stage. Instead, if the government wants to continue to 
play the active role in organizing outside funds of the private venture capital firms, it 
should be more concerned with selecting qualified venture capital firms, monitoring 
the investment activities of those firms, and evaluating their performance. 
Moreover, the fact that a government has an objective to develop a venture 
capital industry does not directly imply that the government should participate 
actively in the fund-raising process of private venture capital firms. A main reason 
why a government tries to develop a venture capital industry is that the industry has 
been assumed to be a pivotal channel in creating an innovative financing for 
earlier-staged firms and those industries that have rapidly changing markets. 
However, the reality shows that the venture capital industry has a tendency to 
evolve in the opposite direction while concentrating its investments on expansion- or 
later-staged companies. As shown in Figure 4, this tendency can be clearly observed 
in the U.S. which has the most developed venture capital industry. Considering this 
trend, the role of the Korean government of directly participating in the fund-raising 
process of private venture capital firms should be in question near in future. In 
Section 4, the data showed that, in Korea, venture capital firms have severely relied 
on the government in the fund-raising stage and this dependency seems to have held 
up to recent days. Furthermore, an empirical analysis in the same section tells us that 
the reputation or maturity of a venture capital firm is not working yet as a signaling 
device in attracting private investors. Considering these findings, it may not be 
appropriate to ask the government to stop its role of providing capital to the private 
venture capital firms immediately. However, the government needs to make a 
long-term plan for developing the venture capital industry and, based on the plan, 
the role of government should be reconsidered. For the Korean government, it 
would be a good alternative for the future to clearly distinguish public venture 
capital firms from private venture capital firms and provide only the public venture 
capital firms with subsidies accompanied by a clear stipulation on their investment 
activities, like the SBIC program in the U.S. This topic is beyond the research area of 
this paper, but important to explore in future researches.  
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[Figure 4] Venture Capital Investment by Stage  
(number of projects/dollar volume) 
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Appendix 
 
 
A. Investment Behaviors of Outside funds  
 
Here I investigate the investment behaviors of outside funds in the aspects of the 
concentration ratio of investment by industry (hhi_inv(O)) and by region (hhi_reg(O)), 
and the average value of shares of an outside fund in invested firms (share(O)).  
For a given outside fund, the concentration ratio of investment by industry was 
computed in the following way, which is similar to the computation of 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI): 
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where pjs is the proportion of money invested to sth industry sub-sector in the 
total amount of investment of outside fund j. Whole industries are classified into 14 
sub-sectors based on KSIC (Korean Standard Industrial Classification) as shown in 
Table A-1.37 The concentration ratio of investment by region was computed in a 
similar way after dividing South Korea into eight regions: 
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where vjr is the proportion of money invested to rth region in the total amount of 
investment of outside fund j. 
For an overview of investment behaviors of outside funds in terms of the 
concentration ratio of investment by industry and by region, and the average value 
of shares of an outside fund in invested firms, Table A-2 tabulates the results of t-test 
analysis. For the t-test analysis, same as Section 5, outside funds organized during 
the venture boom were compared with those organized after the ending of the boom. 
The results of the t-test analysis tell us that the concentration ratio of investment 
by industry and the average value of shares of an outside fund in invested firms 
have significantly increased after the boom burst. The concentration ratio of 
                                            
37 In the venture capital literature, the concentration ratio of investment by industry is generally accepted 
as a device measuring a venture capitalist’s specialized knowledge on a specific industry. In regards to 
agriculture or service sectors, one-digit classification may be sufficient to represent a venture capitalist’s 
specialty on those industries. On the contrary, in cases of manufacturing industries, one-digit classification 
is too broad and two-digit classification may be too narrow to be used for measuring the degree of a 
venture capitalist’s specialty on a certain industry. Considering this discrepancy between the service and 
manufacturing sectors, I re-classified the manufacturing industries into eight subgroups (Ind.2 ~ Ind.9) by 
the similarity in technologies implied by the names of industries, instead of utilizing the two-digit 
classification. While I try to make the classification as objectively as possible, I admit that the classification 
result will be unavoidably arbitrary to some degree and, therefore, is not undisputable.  
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<Table A-1> Classification of Industries 
Classification Covered Industries KSIC Code 
Ind. 1 Agriculture 01, 02 
Ind. 2 Food & textile 15, 17, 36 
Ind. 3 Printing & publication 22 
Ind. 4 Chemicals 24 
Ind. 5 Plastic & non-metal & metal products, 25, 26, 27, 28 
Ind. 6 Machinery & equipment 29, 34 
Ind. 7 Computer and office instrument 30 
Ind. 8 Other electric machinery 31 
Ind. 9 Electronic components & medical & optical & precision machinery 32, 33 
Ind. 10 Wholesale & retail trade 51, 52 
Ind. 11 Information & communication 64 
Ind. 12 Financial & insurance services 65, 66, 67 
Ind. 13 Business services 72, 73, 74, 75 
Ind. 14 Recreational & culture & and sporting activities 87, 88 
 
<Table A-2> Investment Behaviors of Outside Funds: Comparison of Venture 
Boom vs. Post-boom 
Variable Venture boom (1998-2000) 
Post venture 
boom (2001-) Diff. p-value 
Hhi_inv(O) 0.384 0.472 0.088 0.001 
Hhi_reg(O) 0.555 0.585 0.030 0.280 
Share(O)38 10.695 13.348 2.652 0.048 
 
investment by region also increased even though the change is not statistically 
different from zero. Similar to Section 5, I also construct a linear equation for each 
variable as follows, and estimate those for the venture boom period and the 
                                            
38 Table 9 reports that the average value of the ratio of common stock investment in outside funds 
decreased with the venture boom burst from 0.757 to 0.344 and Table A-2 reports that the average value of 
shares of outside funds in invested companies rather increased in the post-boom period from 10.7 percent 
to 13.3 percent. These seemingly contradicting changes over time can be explained by the fact that the 
average size of outside funds became bigger in the post-boom period from $10.05 million to $13.07 million 
and the average amount of capital of invested companies decreased with the boom burst from $14.2 
million to $5.0 million. 
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post-boom period separately.39
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Table A-3 summarizes the estimation results of Equation (A-1). 40  In the 
regression analysis regarding hhi_inv(O), except a weak positive effect of the huddle 
rate, the only two independent variables affecting the concentration ratio of 
investment by industry are industry(0) and rep. The coefficient estimates of 
industry(0) and rep are both positive and statistically different from zero.41 Because 
the proportion of outside funds, of which stipulated main targets of investment are 
culture- and media-related industries, increased to 41 out of 149 funds in the 
post-boom period from 10 out of 127 funds in the venture boom period, a positive 
coefficient of industry(0) will induce a higher value of concentration ratio of 
investment by industry in the post-boom period. Also, the average value of 6.93 
years of rep among outside funds formed during the post-boom period is much 
higher than the average value of 3.99 years during the venture boom period. 
Combined with the positive coefficient of rep, this fact also implies a higher value of 
hhi_inv(O) in the post-boom period. These two differences between the venture 
boom period and post-boom period may explain clearly why the concentration ratio 
of investment by industry has been significantly higher during the post-boom 
period. 
The estimation results regarding the variable share indicate that the maturity of a 
venture capital firm (rep), the size of a fund (size(O)), and the length of life span of a 
fund (length) commonly increase the average share of a fund in the total common 
stock issued by invested firms. But, as mentioned just before, the average value of 
the variable rep is much higher in the post-boom period. The average size of outside 
funds is also bigger in the post-boom period ($10.05 million vs. $13.07 million). The 
proportion of outside funds of which the life span is longer than five years is about 
13% in both periods. From these facts, we can easily expect a higher value of share in 
the post-boom period.  
For the last, the table shows that industry(0) and hrate have positive effects on the 
concentration ratio of investment by region (hhi_reg(O)). As mentioned earlier, the 
higher average value of industry(0) in the post-boom period will imply a higher value 
of concentration ratio in that period. The average value of huddle rates, however, is 
                                            
39 The only difference from Equation (2) is that s_go1, a share of the SMBA and the Fund of funds, is 
included as an explanatory variable instead of dummy variable d(s_go1).   
40 For each dependent variable, I estimate Equation (A-1) using the full sample and separating the sample 
into the venture boom and post-boom period. Since estimation results from the venture boom period and 
those from the post-boom period are very similar qualitatively and quantitatively, I simply report 
estimation results from the full sample in the table. 
41 In fact, the average value of the concentration ratio of investment by industry among outside funds 
whose stipulated main industries of investment are culture and media related amounts to 0. 724. The 
computed average value of hhi_inv(O) among the other outside funds is just 0.352. 
 
246    韓國開發硏究 / 2008. Ⅰ  
 
 
<Table A-3> Estimation Results of Investment Behaviors of Outside Funds (Ⅲ) 
 
hhi_inv(O) share(O) hhi_reg(O) 
Variable 
Coef. (t-value) Coef. (t-value) Coef. (t-value) 
industry(0) 0.361(5.89)***a -0.531(-0.24) 0.344(6.92)*** 
industry(1) -0.057(-1.81)* -3.872(-1.37) -0.091(-1.08) 
scd(O) -0.131(-0.64) 0.144(0.05) 0.056(1.17) 
rep 0.015(2.10)** 0.910(2.22)** -0.002(-0.23) 
size(O) -0.001(01.25) 0.108(2.11)** -0.001(-0.52) 
hrate 0.004(1.27) -0.053(-0.31) 0.007(3.80)*** 
s_vc 0.001(0.65) 0.075(1.79)* -0.000(-0.17) 
s_go1 -0.000(-0.26) 0.000(0.00) -0.000(-0.67) 
length  4.007(2.24)**  
Adj. R-squared 0.6643 0.7929 0.7497 
# of obs. 270 249 279 
Note: a. *, **, and *** indicate a coefficient estimate is statistically different from zero at the significance level 
of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
higher in the venture boom period (12.6% vs. 9.4%), indicating a higher value of 
concentration ratio in the venture boom period. These two countervailing effects 
may be approximately cancelled out, thereby resulting the finding that the 
concentration ratio of investment by region is not statistically different between the 
two compared periods. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
